

T. S. ELIOT'S CONCEPT OF THE ABSOLUTE AND HIS EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF HIS IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE

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In *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley* (published in 1916), Eliot writes, "Experience alone is real ... immediate experience [=direct experience] is the foundation and the goal of our knowing" (*KE* 18). In searching for "immediate experience," Eliot explored Bradley's thought in his doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard, begun while he was a student in Cambridge and completed after he had married and settled in London.¹ However, in 1924, after his long exercise in philosophy, Eliot writes, "His [=Bradley's] philosophy seems to give you everything you ask, and yet to render it not worth wanting."² Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore Eliot's objection to Bradley's metaphysics and see Eliot's struggle for the empirical verification of his immediate experience.

As Eliot writes in the Preface of *Knowledge and Experience*, "... it is suitable that a dissertation on the work of Francis Herbert Bradley should end with the words 'the Absolute' (*KE* 11)," Bradley's central idea is that the Absolute means the whole in which all are the phenomena that we see and experience. Bradley writes, "in the Absolute no appearance can be lost. Each contributes to the unity of the whole ... which comprehends and perfects them" (*AR* 456). Thus, "such a whole state would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling; and in this whole all divisions would be healed up. It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony" (*AR* 172). After Wilbur Long, we can say Bradley's Absolute is "an all-embracing unity that complements, fulfills, or transmutes into a higher synthesis the partial, fragmentary, and self-contradictory experiences, thoughts, purposes, values, and achievements of finite existence."³

Here we should keep in mind that Bradley's concept of the

Absolute is static which responds only to an imaginary demand of thought:

The Absolute responds only to an imaginary demand of thought, and satisfies only an imaginary demand of feeling. Pretending to be something which makes finite centres cohere, it turns out to be merely the assertion that they do (*KE* 202).

It is because Bradley reduces everything to the psychic that Eliot criticizes him, saying, "there is the view of Mr. Bradley, for whom everything is in a way psychical, and for whom therefore the distinction between object and act is not identical with that between an internal and an external reality but is reducible to the problem of knowing one's own mind" (*KE* 58). To Bradley, self-consciousness is "a special way of intuition, or perfection . . . And this experience of both subject and object in one self, or of the identity of Ego through and in the opposition of itself to itself, or generally the self-apprehension of the self as one and many, is at last the full answer to our whole series of riddles" (*AR* 108). On such belief, Bradley even reduces the Absolute to a state of mind. Bradley writes:

My self is certainly not the Absolute, but, without it, the Absolute would not be itself. You cannot anywhere abstract wholly from my personal feelings . . . (*AR* 260).

We know that the main difference between Bradley and Eliot lies whether to admit such mental activity as can be the principle of the most important doctrine of epistemology or not. Eliot writes in the concluding chapter of *Knowledge and Experience*, "Out of absolute idealism we retain what I consider its most important doctrine, Degrees of Truth and Reality and the Internality of Relations; we reject the reliance upon 'consciousness' or 'the work of the mind' as a principle of explanation" (*KE* 153). Eliot writes that there is no such mental activity that can be the principle of his most important doctrine of his epistemology, since Eliot believes that "the mental resolves into a curious and intricate mechanism."

Cut off a 'mental' and 'physical' world, dissect and classify the phenomena of each: the mental resolves into a curious and intricate mechanism, and the physical reveals itself as a mental construct. If you will find it in the workings of mind; and to inspect living mind, you must look nowhere but in the world outside (*KE* 154).

Hence Eliot takes "only physiological or logical activity" (*KE* 153) as his most important doctrine of epistemology.

Based on physiological or logical activity as his doctrine, Eliot thinks of a self as a subject, calling it "the form of a subject of experience, impervious and isolated," but at the same time he thinks of a self as an object, "an ideal and largely a practical construction," "a construction in space and time," and "an object among others, a self among others, and could not exist save in a common world" (*KE* 204). Because Eliot thinks man is an object as well as a subject, man cannot be man as an object unless something completely outside himself exists to objectify man. He writes:

... the object as object cannot be self-supporting. The objectivity is merely externality, and nothing in reality can be merely external, but must possess being 'for' itself. Yet to mean it as an object means to mean it as more than an object, as something ultimately real. And in this way every object leads us far beyond itself to an ultimate reality (*KE* 140).

Knowledge and Experience was written by a distressed young man who is in decisive need of such "an ultimate reality." Such a figure is expressed in the image of Prufrock, the protagonist of Eliot's first notable poem "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" (Published in 1915). Eliot thought that imaginary characters should dramatize "an action or struggle for harmony in the soul of the poet," ("John Ford," 1932, *SE* 173) and he said that J. Alfred Prufrock was in part a man of about forty and in part himself.⁴ Here Prufrock-Eliot is troubled by the "eyes" of condemnation and alienated from his immediate experience:

And I have known the eyes already, known them all —
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?
And how should I presume?
(11. 55-61, *CPP* 14-15)

Prufrock-Eliot recognizes himself pinned down on the wall and deserving to be punished by "the eternal Footman" (1. 85). Alluding to the religious connotation of "Lazarus, come from the dead" (1.94), he himself thinks never to return from hell as we see in the epigraph of the poem:

*S'io credessi che mia risposta fosse
a persona che mai tornasse al mondo,
questa fiamma staria senza più scosse.
Ma per ciò che giammai di questo fondo
non tornò vivo alcun, s'i'odo il vero,
senza tema d'infamia ti rispondo* (*CPP* 13).

"If I thought my answer were to one who ever
could return to the world, this flame should
shake no more;

but since none ever did return alive from this
depth, if what I hear be true, without fear of
infamy I answer thee.⁵

Such keen awareness of condemnation in hell can be called awareness of sin. With such serious awareness of sin, he repeats, "would it have been worth it, after all" (11. 87, 99). Prufrock-Eliot is in decisive need of something outside himself that gets rid of his obsessive awareness of sin and heals a personality which threatened to shatter apart.

Here we should notice from the very beginning Eliot uses the

term Absolute to refer to the Divine. In "Sleen," published in *The Harvard Advocate* of 1910, he writes:

Sunday : this satisfied procession
Of definite Sunday faces;

...

And Life, a little bald and gray,

...

(Somewhat impatient of delay)

On the doorstep of the Absolute (*CPP* 603).⁶

Eliot recognizes that man, though finite, seems to have a sense and taste for the Absolute. He writes in "Second Thought about Humanism," (1929, *SE* 485):

Man is man because he can recognize supernatural realities, not because he can invent them. Either everything in man can be traced as a development from below, or something must come from above. There is no avoiding that dilemma: you must be either a naturalist or a supernaturalist. If you remove from the word 'human' all that the belief in the supernatural has given to man, you can view him finally as no more than an extremely clever, adaptable, and mischievous little animal.

He continues, "man cannot get on without giving allegiance to something outside themselves" ("The Function of Criticism," 1923, *SE* 26). That means that in the long run man has to find a relation to the Absolute as the ultimate and all-embracing reality. Unlike Bradley, Eliot saw the Absolute in the god of religion as an active agent that objectifies man's existence. In short, Eliot identifies the Absolute with God of religion.

Religion implies a relationship between God and man. However, to Bradley, this relation is a sign of imperfection. Bradley writes:

Religion naturally implies a relation between Man and God. Now a relation always ... is self-contradictory. It implies

always two terms which are finite and which claim independence. On the other hand a relation is unmeaning, unless both itself and the relateds are the adjectives of a whole (*AR* 445).

Thus Bradley's Absolute is non-relational. It is "something independent of all relation from man," and it cannot be the god of religion. Bradley continues to write:

God again is a finite object, standing above and apart from man, and is something independent of all relation from man, and is something independent of all relation to his will and intelligence. Hence God, if taken as a thinking and feeling being, has a private personality. But, sundered from those relations which qualified him, God is inconsistent emptiness; and qualified by his relation to an Other, he is distracted finitude. . . . If you identify the Absolute with God, that is God becomes a finite factor in the whole. And effort of religion is to put an end to, and break down, this relation — a relation which, none the less, it essentially presupposes. Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and, having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him. (*AR* 445-447).

In a word, Bradley's non-relational Absolute is "an object of contemplation" (*AR* 408) and cannot be the Absolute Eliot needed.

After his "conscious" and "conscientious" search, Eliot finds it is the dogma of Incarnation that explains the Absolute which has a relation with man as God of religion. Eliot writes:

The Christian thinker — and I mean the man who is trying consciously and conscientiously to explain to himself the sequence which culminates in faith, rather than the public apologist — proceeds by rejection and elimination. He finds the world to be so and so; he finds its character inexplicable by any non-religious theory: among religious he finds Christianity, and Catholic Christianity, to account for the moral world within; and thus, by what Newman calls 'powerful and concurrent' reasons, he finds himself inexorably committed to the dogma of the Incarnation ("The 'Pensées' of Pascal," 1931, *SE* 408).

The Incarnation is the God the Absolute incarnated in one man Jesus Christ. It is best described in "Choruses from The Rock" (1931):

Then came, at a predetermined moment, a moment in time and
of time,
A moment not out of time, but in time, in what we call history:
transecting, bisecting the world of time, a moment in
time but not like a moment of time,
A moment in time but time was made through that moment: for
without the meaning there is not time, and that
moment of time gave the meaning (VII, 11. 15-22,
CPP 160).

The Incarnation is the point through which time was made sense.
And only when one is united to that point, one is actualized. In
"Burnt Norton" it is called "the still point" which brings man into the
immediate experience of "a timeless unity" (*KE* 18):

At the still point of the turning world, neither flesh nor fleshless;
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity.
Where past and future are gathered.

...

The inner freedom from the practical desire,
The release from action and suffering, release from the inner
And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded
By a grace of sense, a white light still and moving,
Erhebung without motion, concentration
Without elimination, both a new world
And the old made explicit, understood
In the completion of its partial ecstasy,
The resolution of its partial horror.
Yet the enchainment of past and future
Woven in the weakness of the changing body,
Protects mankind from heaven and damnation
Which flesh cannot endure (*Four Quartets*, "Burnt Norton," 1935,
11, 61-82, *CPP* 173).

It is this point where the relation of the Absolute with man takes place. Eliot's opposition to his Unitarian background is well recognized in terms of the Unitarian's denial of the Trinity as against Eliot's personal definition of Christianity as a belief in the Incarnation.⁷ Here we can conclude that Eliot's Absolute is God incarnated in Christ.

Eliot writes, "It is recognized in Christian theology . . . that free-will of the natural effort and ability of the individual man and also super-natural grace, a gift accorded we know not quite how, are both required, in co-operation, for salvation" ("The 'Pensées' of Pascal," 1931, *SE* 413). Thus once the Absolute himself takes the initiative in the Incarnation, the possibility of salvation depends on whether our *directio voluntatis* [=direction of will]⁸ goes in parallel with God's will or not. The human consciousness in Christianity is a consciousness or vision of reality that has resulted from a radical change effected by an encounter with the incarnated God, Christ in repentance. Repentance can be understood as changing *directio voluntatis* by leaving the wrong way to get into the way which is in accord with God's will as Lancelot Andrews says in his Ash Wednesday sermon of 1619, "Repentance it selfe is nothing, but *redire ad principia*, a kind of circling; to *return* to Him by *repentance*, from whom, by sinne, we have turned away."⁹

In other words, as Eliot explains Dante's Canto XXVI, we should choose either the flame of purgatory or that of hell:

In this canto the Lustful are purged in flame, yet we see clearly how the flame of purgatory differs from that of hell. In hell, the torment issues from the very nature of the damned themselves, expresses their essence; they writhe in the torment of their own perpetually perverted nature. In purgatory the torment of flame is deliberately and consciously accepted by the penitent The souls in purgatory suffer because they wish to suffer, for purification. And observe that they suffer more actively and keenly, being souls preparing for blessedness, than Virgil suffers in eternal limbo. In their suffering is hope, in the anaesthesia of Virgil is hopelessness; that is the difference ("Dante," 1929; *SE* 255-256).

Moreover Eliot writes, "There is almost a definite moment of acceptance at which the New Life begins" ("Dante," 1929, *SE* 277). It is the moment of getting into the relation with the Absolute by the act of repentance. We well know it is quite dangerous for a critical reader to go deep into someone's life by conjecture, however from some testimonies we can verify the transformation of the soul of the poet. It can be called the transmigration to his acceptance of his purgatorial fire in order to reach his state of immediate experience.

Acroyd's new biographical study tells us that in 1910, at the age of 22, Eliot went to Paris and lived with a handsome young Frenchman named Verdenal. "The two young men were, in any event, in close intellectual and imaginative sympathy."¹⁰ However, the outbreak of World War I separated Eliot from Verdenal. Acroyd writes, "Jean Verdenal became an army medical officer in November 1914, joined the 175th infantry regiment in February 1915 and then three months later was killed in the Dardanelles . . .".¹¹ One of the evidences that show the greatness of Eliot's love for Verdenal is that Eliot dedicated his first published poem, *Prufrock and Other Observations* (1917) to Verdenal, saying, "For Jean Verdenal, 1889-1915 / mort aux Dardanelles" (*CPP* 11). And he added an epigraph from Dante's *Purgatorio*:

*Or puoi la quantitate
Comprender dell'amor ch'a te mi scalda,
quando dismento nostra vanitate,
trattando l'ombre come cosa salda*

"Now canst thou comprehend
the measure of the love which warms me
toward thee, when I forget our nothingness,
and treat shades as a solid thing"
(*Purgatorio*, XXI, 133-136).¹²

Eliot later refers to Verdenal in his "Commentary" in the *Criterion* XIII, 52 (April 1934), "I am willing to admit that my own retrospect is touched by a sentimental sunset, the memory of a friend coming across the Luxemburg Garden in the late afternoon, waving a branch

of lilac, a friend who was later (so far as I could find out) to be mixed with the mud of Gallipole" (p. 452). We know there are varied treatments of the relationship between Eliot and Verdenal. However, we at least understand from Eliot's own comment that for him the loss of Verdenal was serious enough to make him retrospect thereafter. Prufrock's repetition of "would it have been worth it, after all" (ll. 87, 99) expresses such retrospection.

Eliot got married shortly after the death of Jean Verdenal with Vivien on 26 June 1915. We have enough evidence that their married life was not a happy one. According to Bertrand Russell, as soon as they got married, Vivien showed an "impulse of . . . Dostoevski type of cruelty," and she "lived on a knife-edge, and will end as a criminal or a saint."¹³ Russell also witnesses that Eliot was ashamed of his marriage:

She [= Vivien] is light, a little vulgar, adventurous, full of life — an artist I think he [= Eliot] said, but I should have thought her an actress. He is exquisite and listless; she says she married him to stimulate him, but finds she can't do it. Obviously he married in order to be stimulated. I think she will soon be tired of him. She refuses to go to America to see his people, for fear of submarines. He is ashamed of his marriage, and very grateful if one is kind to her (*Ibid.*, 54).

From these biographical searches we understand that there was a deep love of Eliot's for Verdenal who was killed in the war. When Eliot got married to Vivien, he was ashamed of his marriage. The awareness of sin which tormented him since his early youth culminates in his a "wife obsession."¹⁴ Eliot knew that he could not love his wife. His continual obsessive awareness of sin can be found in his "Sweeney Erect" (1920). The epigraph of the poem is the outcry of the deserted maiden Aspasia from *The Maid's Tragedy* II, ii, by Francis Beaumont (1584-1616) and John Fletcher (1579-1625). Aspasia was the heroine victimized by a sordid sexuality:

And the trees about me

*Let them be dry and leafless; let the rocks
Groan with continual surges; and behind me
Make all a desolation. Look, look, wenches !
(CPP 42)*

Aspasia connotes the myth of Ariadne, who helped Theseus in destroying the Minotaur only to be deserted by him later in Naxos. Since Eliot is on his way to a desert with his wife, he identifies himself with Theseus in his own agonized awareness of sin. Eliot-Theseus cries:

Paint me a cavernous waste shore
Cast in the unstilled Cyclades,
Paint me the bold anfractuous rocks
Faced by the snarled and yelping seas.

Display me Aeolus above
Reviewing the insurgent gales
Which tangle Ariadne's hair
And swell with haste the perjured sails
(11. 1-8, CPP 42).

We see that the agony was so real to Eliot-Theseus that he can visualize every detail of his deserting his wife. From such agony Eliot is cured. It is in *Ash-Wednesday* (1930) that Eliot expresses his explicit religious faith in the first person. As Hugh Kenner in *The Pound Era* points out, the "Lady" can be Vivien Eliot "In a white gown" (1. 58) of a nursing home.¹⁵

Lady of silences
Calm and distressed
Torn and most whole
Rose of memory
Rose of forgetfulness
Exhausted and life-giving
Worried reposeful

...

End of the endless
 Journey to no end
 Conclusion of all that
 Is inconclusible
 (11. 69-83, *CPP* 91-92)

Eliot deserted Vivien and she died in a nursing home.¹⁶ His heart was dissected alive in his agony. He had to give up all the pride natural to man in order to accept this sacrifice. Yet he had no alternative. He had to turn Vivien into a symbol of Christ's redemption. That was the only way for him to be relieved from his agony. Otherwise he would never recover. Because of the grace of Vivien, Eliot's Beatrice figure, the dried bones which had been eaten by leopards have now recovered. Proffering the agonized past in oblivion, Eliot invokes:

Lady, three white leopards sat under a juniper tree
 In the cool of the day, having fed to satiety
 On my legs my heart my liver and that which had been contained
 In the hollow round of my skull. And God said
 Shall these bones live? shall these
 Bones live? And that which had been contained
 In the bones (which were already dry) said chirping:
 Because of the goodness of this Lady
 And because of her loveliness of this, and because
 She honours the Virgin in meditation,
 We shine with brightness. And I who am here dissembled
 Proffer my deeds to oblivion, and my love
 To the posterity of the desert and the fruit of the gourd.
 It is this which recovers
 My guts the strings of my eyes and the indigestible portions
 Which the leopards reject (11. 42-57, *CPP* 91).

The white leopards symbolize worldly desire that exhausted him.¹⁷ Now Eliot sees that past years have been redeemed:

Here are the years that walk between, bearing

Away the fiddles and the flutes, restoring
One who moves in time between sleep and waking, wearing

White light folded, sheathed about her, folded.
The new years walk, restoring
Through a bright cloud of tears, the years, restoring
With a new verse the ancient rhyme. Redeem
The time. Redeem
The unread vision in the higher dream
White jewelled unicorns draw by the gilded hearse
(11. 131-140, *CPP* 94).

The past years that Eliot and Vivien were continuously quarrelling are entirely transformed. The line "White jewelled unicorns draw by the gilded hearse" connotes the triumphant chariot of the Church drawn by a griffin that represents Christ in *Purgatorio* XXIX. This line introduces a gilded hearse. It is a symbol of death transformed. Also it connotes Blake's "marriage-hearse"¹⁸ which is a funeral and wedding together. Because Eliot accepts, by the grace of Christ, that his marriage is a failure, as it has been, he is no longer obsessed by the past. Eliot the protagonist recovers his sensuous joy which he has long forgotten under the depression of a severe awareness of sin:

From the wide window towards the granite shore
The white sails still fly seaward, seaward flying
Unbroken wings

And the lost heart stiffens and rejoices
In the lost lilac and the lost sea voices
And the weak spirit quickens to rebel
For the bent golden-rod and the lost sea smell
Quickens to recover
The cry of quail and the whirling plover
And the blind eye creates
The empty forms between the ivory gates
And smell renews the salt savour of the sandy earth
(11. 192-203, *CPP* 98)

Here he gets direct contact with reality. He is in the state of immediate experience which he has been seeking so long. After his ordeal Eliot reaches his salvation which is "a condition of complete simplicity / (Costing not less than everything)" ("Little Gidding," 1942, 11. 253, 254, *CPP* 198).

In conclusion Eliot's Absolute is not Bradley's static Absolute, but incarnated Christ. Christ is the "wounded surgeon" ("East Coker," 1940, 1. 147, *CPP* 181) who is tormented by God on behalf of us sinners. To be relieved, we must "freeze / And quake in frigid purgatorial fires / Of which the flame is roses, and the smoke is briars" ("East Coker," 11. 164-166, *CPP* 181). By living a paradox, to receive the warmth of life it is necessary to freeze in frigid fires of purgation, thereby cleansing the imperfection of our temporal desires. And beneath the necessary pain, the flower of possible redemption awaits. Eliot alludes to the state of mind of harmonious arrangement: "You may call it communion with the Divine, or you may call it a temporary crystallization of the mind"¹⁹ It is the immediate experience which is "timeless unity" (*KE* 31) and goal of his knowing (*KE* 15). Here Eliot's philosophical search attains empirical verification in his religious experience.

Notes

N. B. — The following abbreviations are used:

AR for Bradley, Francis Herbert. *Appearance and Reality*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1893.

CPP for Eliot, T. S. *The Complete Poems and Plays*. London: Faber & Faber, 1985.

KE for Eliot, T. S. *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley*. London: Faber & Faber, 1964.

SE for Eliot, T. S. *Selected Essays*. London: Faber & Faber, 1986.

1. It is accepted nowadays that F. H. Bradley is not a marginal but central influence on Eliot. See Valerie Eliot, "Introduction," *T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts, Including the Annotations of Ezra Pound* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), p. ix; Hugh Kenner, *The Invisible Poet: T. S. Eliot* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959), pp. 40-69; E. P. Bollier, "T. S.

- Eliot and F. H. Bradley: A Question of Influence," *Tulane Studies in English* 12 (1962) : 87-111 ; Lewis Freed, *T. S. Eliot: Aesthetics and History* (La Salle, Ill. : Open Court, 1962), and *T. S. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher* (West Lafayette, Ind. : Purdue Univ. Press, 1979) ; Eric Thompson, *T. S. Eliot: The Metaphysical Perspective* (Carbondale, Ill. : Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1963) ; J. Hills Miller, *Poets of Reality: Six Twentieth-Century Writers* (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 131-89 ; George Whiteside, "T. S. Eliot's Dissertation," *Journal of English Literary History* 34 (Sept. 1967) : 400-424 ; John J. Soldo, "Knowledge and Experience in the Criticism of T. S. Eliot," *Journal of English Literary History* 35 (June 1968) : 284-308 ; Anne C. Bolgan, "The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley and the Mind and Art of T. S. Eliot: An Introduction," in S. P. Rosenbaum, ed., *English Literature and British Philosophy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 251-77, and *What the Thunder Really Said: A Retrospective Essay on the Making of The Waste Land* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1973) ; Mowbray Allan, *T. S. Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry* (Lewisburg, Pa. : Bucknell Univ. Press, 1974) ; Piers Gray, *T. S. Eliot's Intellectual and Poetic Development, 1909-1922* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982) ; Richard Wolheim, "Eliot and F. H. Bradley: An account," in Graham Martin, ed., *Eliot in Perspective: A Symposium* (London: Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 169-93.
- 2 . *Vanity Fair* (U.S.A.) (Feb. 1924), pp. 29, 98. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Totowa, N. J. : Littlefield, Adams, 1962), p. 2.
 - 3 . *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Totowa, N. J. : Littlefield, Adams, 1962), p.2.
 - 4 . In addition to "Spleen" (1910), "Conversation Galante" (1909) and several early manuscript poems use the term Absolute to refer to the Divine. See, for instance, in the Berg Collection of the New York Public Library, "Suite Clownesque" and "He said this universe is very clever."
 - 5 . *The Inferno of Dante Aligheire*, trans., J. A. Carlisle (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1962), p. 303
 - 6 . Interview, *Grantite Review*, 24, No. 3 (1962), pp. 16-20.
 - 7 . Eliot thinks of himself as one brought up 'outside the Christian Fold' (Letter to Burtran Russell (22 June 1927), Russell Archive, McMaster Univ. See also review of Middleton Mury's *Son of Woman: The Story of D. H. Lawrence*, *Criterion*, 10 (July 1931), 771. "The function of

- Criticism," *SE*, p. 26.
8. *De Vulgari Eloquentio*, II, ii, . "The 'Pensées' of Pascal," 1931, *SE*, p. 408
 9. Andrews, "Sermon 4 Of Repentance: Ash Wednesday 1619", p. 122, quoted in Nancy Gish, *Time in the Poetry of T. S. Eliot* (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 73.
 10. Peter Acroyd, *T. S. Eliot* (London: Cox & Wyman, 1984), p. 42.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
 12. *The Purgatorio of Dante Alighiere* (London: Dent & Sons, 1962), p. 267.
 13. Russell, Burtrand, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), pp. 55-56.
 14. Wyndham Lewis to Sidney Schiff, 2 May 1922, British Library. Cited by Peter Acroyd, p. 104.
 15. Hugh Kenner, *The Pound Era* (London: Faber & Faber, 1973, p. 277.
 16. According to Thomas Matthew, Eliot sailed on the *Tuscania* from Boston to Greenock on June 24, 1933 and "instead of returning home, he went to stay at Frank Morley's farm in Surrey ... Eliot's lawyer had drawn up a deed of Separation, and the papers had been served on Vivienne, together with a letter from Eliot explaining — or trying to explain — what he was doing" (T. S. Matthew, *Great Tom: Notes Towards the Definition of T. S. Eliot* (New York: Haper & Row, 1973), pp. 116-117.)
 17. See *The Inferno of Dante Alighieri* (London: Dent & Sons, 1962), p. 11.
 18. William Blake "London" from *Songs of Experience* (1974) :

I wander through each chartered street,
Near where the chartered Thames does flow,
And mark in every face I meet

...

But more, through midnight streets I hear
How the youthful harlot's curse
Blasts the new-born infant's tear,
And blights with plagues the marriage hearse.

19. "The 'Pensées' of Pascal," *SE*, P. 405.

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